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Capital Reductions
H E liberality which characterizes the
Tcorporation
laws of some states tends

to a frame of mind which dismisses from
serious consideration reported actions of
corporations organized under the laws of
those states. One reads in the newspapers
of certain actions taken by a corporation
existing under authority of the laws of a
certain state, and passes along to other
news items with the thought that anything
approved by formal vote of directors, is
possible under such laws. The action need
not be rational. It may be unsound economically. The effect may be a suppression
of the facts. But if expediency so dictates,
and the action is taken properly, the action
has the stamp of legality. Such is likely to
be the mental attitude of one who is
familiar with these matters.
In fairness to such laws, it is interesting
to consider, without prejudice, the proposed action of a certain holding company
as reported in the news column. Is the
action facilitated by the laws governing
the organization and corporate conduct of
the company in question? Is there anything questionable about the proposed action? Does it gain any improper advantage on account of the character of its
shares of capital stock and the laws authorizing the issuance of such shares?
"The Blank Corporation has called a
special meeting of class B stockholders for
November 28 to vote on a proposal to reduce the stated value of the class B stock
from 365,849,369.00 to 346,842,721.00,
thereby creating capital and capital surplus
and applying a portion of the capital and

surplus to write investments down to
market value.
"The purpose of the proposal is to reduce
the paid-in capital of the class B stock
from 310.00 to 35.00 and bring about a
capital readjustment and thereby correct
the existing situation under which the payment of dividends may be interrupted,
while the corporation is receiving income
from investments sufficient to cover dividend requirements."
The foregoing quotations, slightly disguised, are as reported by the press from
the company's announcement. The discussion which follows is based on the newspaper statement.
Analyzing the announcement, it is apparent that the company issued some of its
stock for, or purchased from the proceeds
thereof, certain securities, at prices, which,
on the basis of the market (October 31,
1930) would have to be reduced substantially. This would result in a material reduction of the balance sheet value of the
securities owned. The paper loss incident
to such devaluation presumably would be
large. It would be too large to permit of
absorption by the surplus accounts, the
character of which is not disclosed. The
corporation may have had earned surplus,
or surplus arising from valuation of securities, or paid-in surplus resulting from
arbitrary classification of paid-in capital.
At any rate, whether from motives of necessity, or of expediency, there was not sufficient surplus to absorb the write down.
And so, it is proposed that stated capital
shall be adjusted, so reducing it as to make
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available an amount sufficient to absorb
the loss and still, presumably, leave a cushion to guard against further market declines and afford a reasonable remainder
in the surplus available for dividends.
Action such as the foregoing, which recently has been followed by several corporations, particularly of the investment
trust class, doubtless is facilitated by the
laws of certain states. If a corporation
such as the type in question had nothing
but capital stock with par value, it would
be necessary by formal action to reduce
the par value of the stock, call in all the
old stock and issue new stock in its place.
This procedure in some cases would be a
sizable undertaking. Where the shares
have no par value, the matter becomes one
merely of accounting based, however, on
formal action. In other words, a resolution of the directors, ratified by the stockholders whose capital would be affected,
transferring an amount per share from
capital to capital surplus, would serve as
the authority for the accounting action.
Such action would consist in transferring
an amount from capital to capital surplus
and charging against that surplus the
amount of decline in the value of securities
from cost to the lower market.
This action would save the corporation
from any charge of having paid dividends
when its capital was impaired, as might
have been the case if the capital had not
been legally reduced. It is easy to understand that if the loss in asset value of securities had been charged against earned
surplus or previous capital surplus, such
surplus might have been insufficient to absorb the capital loss, and that even though
subsequent income might be sufficient to
pay subsequent dividends, a considerable
portion of such income might be needed to
restore capital before the dividends could
be paid legally.
There is a doctrine running generally
through the corporation laws of the various states, that dividends may not be paid
legally while there is an impairment of
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capital. This is true of Delaware except
that the protection of capital from the payment of dividends is limited to shares having a preference in liquidation, as will be
seen from the following:
"Section 34. Dividends; Reserves:—
The directors of every corporation created
under this Chapter, subject to any restrictions contained in its Certificate of Incorporation, shall have power to declare and
pay dividends upon the shares of its capital
stock either (a) out of its net assets in
excess of its capital as computed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 14,
26, 27 and 28 of this Chapter, or (b) in
case there shall be no such excess, out of
its net profits for the fiscal year then current and /or the preceding fiscal year; provided, however, that if the capital of the
corporation computed as aforesaid shall
have been diminished by depreciation in
the value of its property, or by losses, or
otherwise, to an amount less than the aggregate amount of the capital represented
by the issued and outstanding stock of all
classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets, the directors of such
corporation shall not declare and pay out
of such net profits any dividends upon any
shares of any classes of its capital stock
until the deficiency in the amount of the
capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets shall
have been repaired." * * *
There is nothing further in the section
that qualifies the foregoing. The sections
referred to (Sections 14, 26, 27 and 28)
cover respectively, issuance of shares,
amendment of certificate of incorporation,
retirement of preferred shares, and reduction of capital. The provisions therein do
not interfere with the rules laid down in
Section 34.
Out of the section just quoted, one might
read that common capital may be paid
away as dividends. "Capital * * * diminished * * * by losses, or otherwise, * * *"
might so imply. Capital might be dim-
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inished "otherwise" by the payment of
dividends. It is doubted, however, if this
would be a fair inference. The word
"capital" used in a general sense is all
embracive. It does not distinguish one
class from another. It includes both preferred and common capital as those classes
are denoted by preferred and common
shares. Consequently, any excess of net
assets over capital must mean any amount
of net assets in excess of capital as represented by both preferred and common
capital stock. If the directors may declare
a dividend out of any such excess, it is fair
to assume that they may not declare a
dividend if there is no such excess.
The significance of the provision for declaration of dividends out of "its net profits
for the fiscal year then current and /or the
preceding fiscal year" is more difficult to
interpret. Reference to the "current fiscal
year" is understandable. A corporation
might have had its common capital impaired by depreciation in the value of its
property, or by losses, and yet make a
profit during a current fiscal year. The
meaning of the statute in this respect is
clear, namely, that even though common
capital may be impaired, profits for the
current year may be appropriated for dividends without the necessity of first making
up the impairment of common capital.
The words "and /or the preceding year"
appear to have been inserted by some
zealous, although not fully informed, lawmaker in the excitement of legislative pressure, inasmuch as any profits in a preceding
year, if not used to repair capital, would
result in net assets in excess of capital in
the current year. If profits in the preceding year had been used to repair capital,
how could they be used for dividends in
the current year without paying dividends
out of capital? The statute must mean,
therefore, that, if necessary, action through
which capital was repaired in a preceding
year may be reversed, if profits in the current year are not sufficient for dividends
and profits for the preceding year may be
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made available for dividends in the current
year. Only in this way does it seem possible to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the statute. It must not be forgotten, however, that preference stock
marks the dead-line where the latitude
stops.
In the light of the foregoing, one may
say that there appears to be nothing questionable legally about the proposed action
of various investment trusts to reduce their
capital, where the corporation laws under
which they were chartered are as elastic as
those of Delaware. Further, there seems
not to be anything morally or economically
questionable about such proposed action.
Price levels in the stock market patently
are lower than they have been for some
years. Perhaps they are permanently
lower. At least the prospects are that they
will remain lower for some time to come.
And it seems to be the part of wisdom to
recognize this condition and adjust the
asset value of securities accordingly. However, when and if the price level definitely
rises to a point where it may be expected
to remain for a while, any readjustment upward of asset values should result in a
credit to capital, not to earned surplus.
The adjustment of capital downward is
logical, if capital was invested originally in
securities which have declined severely and
somewhat permanently in market value.
But any later adjustment upward should
be consistent. If loss in security values impairs capital, a recovery in such values
would repair capital. On the other hand,
if such book losses were to be charged
against earned surplus, or against capital
surplus, it would not seem inconsistent to
repair such accounts, if losses in value
later are reinstated. This, however, raises
a question concerning securities written
down now and later sold at a price in excess
of book value. Where should the profit be
credited? The answer should not be difficult: to capital, if a loss in excess of the
profit was charged against capital; to capital surplus, if the charge for decline was
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made against capital surplus; to earned
surplus, if the charge was against that
account. But, none of these corporations
probably will increase the stated value of
its capital shares unless recovery becomes
so marked as to result in a large capital surplus. And they will be within their rights,
having taken formal action to reduce their
stated capital. They would be within
their legal rights also, undoubtedly, if they
were to insist on crediting the profit to
earned surplus and paying it out as dividends, inasmuch as the adjustment of
stated capital is tantamount to apportioning their capital to absorb a loss. If the
loss is not sustained, the action in segregating a part of their capital to absorb a
loss has in reality served to create a
surplus.
These corporations gain no improper advantage necessarily from shares having no
par value and from laws permitting wide
latitude of action. It would be a silly law
that would not permit a corporation to
adjust its capital account to give effect to
capital losses. No legislation can prevent
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a corporation from losing money. One
may take issue with a law that permits contributed capital to be apportioned at time
of receipt between capital account and surplus account, and still find no fault with the
same law that sanctions and encourages a
corporation which has lost part of its capital to adjust its capital accounts accordingly. Any group of stockholders may
agree among themselves to do anything
legal or not to do anything illegal. If the
stockholders in a given group agree that
they have lost a part of their capital, what
is more logical than to agree to give expression to that loss.
In a matter of shares without par value,
nothing is gained through placing a stated
value on each share except convenience in
accounting for any number of shares less
than the whole. The capital account might
be reduced, or increased, as easily if the
shares had no stated value. In the instant
case, shares without par value permit of a
ready reduction in capital without having
to call in and exchange all outstanding
shares.

